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Alimony in Indiana Under No-Fault Divorce
INTRODUCTION
The nation has been witnessing a major revolution in the law of
divorce in recent years. Since 1970 more than 30 states have adopted a
system of no-fault divorce or have added no-fault grounds within a
fault system.' Indiana joined this revolution in 1973. Serious op-
position had been expected in the Indiana legislature to changing the
statutory grounds for divorce to irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
The greatest conflict arose, however, with regard to the provisions for
property distribution rather than over the change to "no-fault" grounds
for dissolution. Property distribution may take one of two forms, divi-
sion of property or maintenance. Property division is a final settle-
ment of the parties' assets made at the time of the dissolution,
whereas maintenance is an ongoing obligation for purposes of support
to the ex-spouse.3 The Indiana General Assembly worked three years
on the new code, using the 1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
as a model; but when the Act finally became law in 1973, significant
changes had been made from the Uniform Act's provisions for divi-
sion of property and maintenance of the ex-spouse.' The maintenance
I See BNA FAMILY L. Rpm. 401:0001-452:0002 (Ref. File 1974) for the full text of
existing current divorce laws, and the full text of all amendmen s to them.2 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1-11.5 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
SUnder the prior law the term "alimony" was used to descrbe both maintenance and
a division of property. The modem view is to separate these two awards. Throughout
this note, the term "alimony" is used to refer to both forms of property distribution, and
ihe term "support" is used to refer to maintenance only.
4 See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (1970) § 307 (Disposition of Property),
§ 308 (Maintenance) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Act]. The Uniform Act was re-
vised in 1973, and an Alternative A was added to section 307:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, leg;l separation, or dis-
position of property following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal sep-
aration by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or
lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without regard to mari-
tal misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, finally equit-
ably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or
both however and whenever acquired, and whether the title thereto is in the
name of the husband or wife or both. In making apportionment the
court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of
either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, oc-
cupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the ap-
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provisions taken from the Uniform Act,' which recognized support
payments in certain circumstances, had been fully deleted, reflecting
Indiana's traditional refusal to award support. Yet, a new provision,
unique to Indiana's code, was later added, providing for maintenance
when a spouse has been "physically or mentally incapacitated."' Further
confusing the distinction between the concepts of property division and
maintenance was the addition of an inquiry into "the earnings or
earning ability of the parties '" to the criteria governing property divi-
sion. The result of these changes is that the legislature-perhaps unin-
tentionally-may have in effect established unlimited maintenance in
Indiana, a result which the Uniform Act itself would not permit.
This note will explore the possible ramifications of these new pro-
visions. Indiana courts have traditionally been reluctant to award main-
tenance even under statutes arguably authorizing such awards. The
new maintenance provision may fall to a similar narrow interpretation,
making it unlikely that courts will award maintenance even in situations
apparently anticipated by the new code. Countering this, however, are
recent appellate court decisions8 allowing what are in effect maintenance
awards under the guise of a property division. The narrow interpre-
tation of the maintenance provisions will not allow for maintenance
where it is needed, while the use of property division to accomplish
maintenance purposes circumvents the limitations on maintenance
the General Assembly sought to impose, and further fails to achieve the
portionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of
each for future acquistion of capital assets and income. The court shall also con-
sider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contri-
bution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit
(b) In the proceeding, the court may protect and promote the best inter-
ests of the children by setting aside a portion of the jointly and separately held
estates of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance,
education, and general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent children
of the parties.
Alternative B reads essentially the same as section 307, of the 1970 draft. The Com-
ment states that Alternative A is the alternative recommended generally for adoption. It
proceeds upon the principle that all the property of the spouses, however acquired, should
be regarded as assets of the married couple, available for distribution among them, upon
consideration of the various factors enumerated in subsection (a). "Alternative B was
included because a number of Commissioners from community property states repre-
sented that their jurisdictions would not wish to substitute, for their own systems, the
great hotchpot of assets created by Alternative A . . . ." Id. § 307.
5 See Uniform Act § 308, PRoPosED AcT OF THE CIvM CODE STUDY CoMMISSION § 210
(1970).
6 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
7 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11(e) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
8 Hibbard v. Hibbard, - Ind. App. - , 315 N.E.2d 731 (1974) ; Weiss v. Weiss,
- Ind. App. - , 306 N.E.2d 120 (1974).
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collateral benefits, as in tax law, of calling a maintenance award what
it is.' This note suggests ways in which courts may interpret the new
Act that will more properly implement the overall legislative design, and
suggests changes the General Assembly can make in the maintenance
and division of property sections of the code which will better clarify
and coordinate the manifest policies the Act seeks to further.
PRE-1973 LAW-STATUTES AND CASES
The fault system of divorce under which Indiana operated until
1973 was based upon the century-old code'0 which included an alimony
statute providing:
The courts shall fix the amount of alimony and shall enter a
judgment for such sum, and specify the character and method
of payment, which in his discretion he deems to b! just and proper
under all of the evidence. . . .1
It was uncertain whether this statute delineating the method of payment
limited alimony solely to a present and complete settlement of the prop-
erty rights of the parties, or whether courts could also make alimony
awards for the future maintenance of a spouse. Indiana courts were
unwilling to interpret the alimony statutes to ma:e an allowance for
maintenance awards.
12
G There are several important practical consequences to cla ;sifying an award either
as support or as a division of property. Alimony awarded for support is tax deductible
by the payor whereas property (including cash) relinquished ander a division is not.
See INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 71(a) (1), (c) (2), 215, which allows the spouse who pays
the support to deduct the amount paid to a former spouse and requires the spouse receiv-
ing the support to pay income tax on the amount received. Support payments are modi-
fiable whenever there is a substantial change of circumstances. A division of property,
however, is a final settlement between the parties and is not modifiable. Support awards
may be enforced by contempt of court citations should a spouse be delinquent in making
payments. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMeEsric RELATIONS 465-67 (1968). A division of
property award is considered a debt, and it would be unconstitutional to imprison a per-
son for failure to pay his debts. IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22. See CLARK at 467.
10 [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43. The code contained one section authorizing alimony
payments, id. § 20, and another fixing the method of payment, id. i 22, as amended, [19491
Ind. Acts, ch. 120, § 3.
11 [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43, § 22, at 107, as amended, [1949] Ind. Acts, ch. 120, § 3,
at 310, formerly codified at IND. CODE § 31-1-12-17 (1971).
12 In taking this position, the courts relied on the following language from the
method of payment provision: "The decree of alimony to the wile shall be for a sum in
gross, and not for annual payments . . . ." [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43, § 22 (emphasis
added). The courts construed this provision to require a judgment for a specific amount
and not for installments without limit as to amount. Marsh v. Marsh, 162 Ind. 210, 70
N.E. 154 (1904); Runyan v. Runyan, 72 Ind. App. 469, 126 N.E. 35 (1920); Boggs v.
Boggs, 45 Ind. App. 397, 90 N.E. 1040 (1910). For a discussion of the confusion in the
application of this statute see Note, Indiana's Alimony Confusion, 45 IN. L.J. 595
(1970); Note, Alimony in Indiana: Traditional Concepts v. Benefit to Society, 29 IND.
LJ. 461 (1954).
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Despite this prevailing view there were some suggestions that sup-
port awards were authorized. Certain language in the 1949 amend-
ments to the method-of-payment provisions of the alimony statutes could
be interpreted as allowing a court discretion to make support awards.1
For a time several cases seemed to indicate that the courts would rec-
ognize the language in the statute relating to periodic payments and
begin to make support awards.'4 In State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan
Circuit Court,5 the Indiana Supreme Court allowed an action for con-
tempt against a husband who failed to make monthly money payments
as well as monthly mortgage payments. Since the court had earlier held
that obligations incurred under a property division were not enforce"
able through an action for contempt, 6 it appeared that the court was
construing the 1949 amendments to provide for support payments.
The dispute, however, remained unresolved as the supreme court
more often than not embraced the contradictory position that support
payments were inconsistent with the statute.' A more recent case, State
ex rel. Schutz v. Marion Superior Court," explicitly retreated from the
position taken in Roberts, narrowly interpreting that case as permitting
contempt proceedings only where the husband was delinquent in making
mortgage payments. The notion that contempt proceedings may be
"s In determining the method of the payment of the alimony the court may re-
quire that it be paid in gross or in periodic payments, either equal or unequal,
and if to be paid in periodic payments the court may further provide for their
discontinuance or reduction upon the death or remarriage of the wife, and, in
his discretion, the court may further provide for such security, bond, or other
guarantee as shall be satisfactory to the court for the purpose of securing the
'obligation to make such periodic payments.
[19491 Ind. Acts, ch. 120, § 3, at 313, amending [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43, § 22, formerly
codified at IND. CODE § 31-1-12-17 (1971). Of special significance was the language in
the statute relating to periodic payments and the discontinuance of those payments on the
death or remarriage of the wife.
14In re Webb, 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958) ; State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan
Cir. Ct, 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.E.2d 871 (1968) ; McDaniel v. McDaniel, 245 Ind. 551, 201
N.E.2d 215 (1964); Wellington v. Wellington, - Ind. App. -, 304 N.E.2d 347
(1973) ; Baxter v. Baxter, 138 Ind. App. 24, 195 N.E.2d 877 (1964) ; Bahre v. Bahre, 133
Ind. App. 567, 181 N.E.2d 639 (1962).
15 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.E.2d 871 (1968).
16 Marsh v. Marsh, 162 Ind. 210, 70 N.E. 154 (1904).
17 The Indiana Supreme Court held in Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 214, 132 N.E.2d
612, 614 (1956) :
Alimony is awarded in Indiana for the purpose of making a present and com-
plete settlement of the property rights of the parties. It does not include future
support for the wife, nor is it intended as a medium for providing financial
compensation for injured sensitivities during marriage.
See also Doner v. Doner, - Ind. App. -, 302 N.E.2d 511 (1973) ; Sidebottom v.
Sidebottom, 140 Ind. App. 657, 225 N.E.2d 772 (1967); Smith v. Smith, 131 Ind. App.
38, 169 N.E.2d 130 (1960).
is Ind. - , 307 N.E.2d 53 (1974).
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used to enforce support payments was expressly rejected.1
The Schutz decision compounded, rather than clarified, the alimony
confusion." Perhaps the result can best be explained as an indication of
the court's unwillingness to embrace support alimony in Indiana. The
result takes on added significance because the decision, though decided
under the old law, was made after the new code had been passed-when
the court would have been aware of the legislative history and intent
of the new law. Schutz may be viewed as an indirect response to the
legislature and as a signal as to how the new alimrony law may be in-
terpreted.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NEW ACT
The Civil Code Study Commission Subcommittee on Juvenile Pro-
cedure and Dissolution of Marriage, which was charged with redrafting
the divorce code, used as its model the 1970 version of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act.2" The only major change from the Uniform
29 Id. at - , 307 N.E.2d at 55.
20 Chief Justice Arterburn wrote a dissenting opinion in which he made three quite
compelling arguments. First, he noted that the code at that timL (section 31-1-12-17, dis-
cussed supra note 13) provided for payments of alimony in installments and provided for
its discontinuance in case of death or of remarriage of the wife. "In other words," he
concluded, "it has all the characteristics of support. .. ." Id. at - , 307 N.E.2d at 56.
Second, he noted that Roberts was the more enlightened rule snce it was decided after
the 1949 amendments to section 31-1-12-17, whereas Marsh had been decided prior to its
passage. He expressed agreement with the holding in State ex rel. Roberts v. Morgan
Cir Ct., 249 Ind. 649, 232 N.E.2d 871 (1968), that alimony payments in installments may
be enforced by a contempt action, which would be an appropriate remedy to enforce a
support judgment. Third, he could find "no historical or rational basis for the distinction
attempted to be made in the majority opinion." Id. Since a cortempt action is available
only to enforce a support judgment and not a division of property, it is difficult to see
how the court logically could say it is proper to order contempt for failure to make the
mortgage payments but improper to order contempt for failure to pay a money judgment
21 The sixth and final draft of the Proposed Act was completed in 1970. Section
209, Disposition of Property, read:
In an action pursuant to Section 201(a) or 201(b), the court shall divide
the property of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to the mar-
riage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage,
or acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either
by division of property in kind, or by setting the same or parts thereof over to
one of the spouses and requiring the other to pay such sum as may be just and
proper, or by ordering the sale of the same under such conditions as the court
may prescribe and dividing the proceeds of such sale.
In determining what is just and reasonable the court stall consider the fol-
lowing factors:
(a) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property,
including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) the extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse prior
to the marriage or through inheritance or gift;
(c) the economic circumstances of the spouse at the time the disposition
is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family residence or right to dwell therein for such periods as the
1975]
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Act in the maintenance and division of property sections of the Sub-
committee's Proposed Dissolution of Marriage Act was to allow the
court to make a final disposition of all property without regard to
whether it was marital or not."
This proposed act became the basis of House Bill No. 1179 as
introduced in the 1971 session of the legislature." No significant
court may deem just to the spouse having custody of any children.
The Comment to Section 209 explained:
The disposition of property will be incident to an action for dissolution of
marriage or will follow a dissolution of the marriage in a prior judgment
by a court which had jurisdiction only to dissolve the marriage. The factors
to be considered in determining whether the property settlement is reasonable
and just are similar to those contained in the Sixth Draft of [the] Uniform
Regulation and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
Section 210, Maintenance, provided:
(a) In an action pursuant to Section 201(a), (b) or (c), the court may
grant a support order, denominated a maintenance order, for either spouse only
if it finds
(1) that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient income and
property to provide for his reasonable financial needs and
(2) that the spouse seeking support is unable to support himself through
employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or cir-
cumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required
to seek employment outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in such amount and for such periods of
time as the court may deem just. Such order may make the future payments
conditional or terminable under circumstances prescribed therein and it may be
in periodic payments or on a percentage of earnings or on any other basis.
The amount and conditions of such order shall be determined after considera-
tion of all relevant factors, including:
(1) financial resources of the party seeking maintenance and his ability
to meet his financial needs independently;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to en-
able the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) th" physical or mental condition of the spouse seeking main-
tenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
his own financial needs.
The Comments to Section 210 stated:
(a) This section probably represents a change in Indiana law . . and
will allow for, under the narrow conditions set out in this section, a support
award. Maintenance payments are amounts for the support of one spouse and
are unrelated to a division of the property owned by the spouses. An award of
maintenance payments may be made to either spouse if the conditions outlined
in subsections (1) and (2) are met. These conditions were taken from the
Sixth Draft of the Uniform Regulation and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
(b) The court is given wide discretion in fixing the terms and conditions of
the award to meet the individual needs of the spouses. The factors deemed rele-
vant to the duration and amount of maintenance payments are similar to those in
the Sixth Draft of the Uniform Regulation and Dissolution of Marriage Act.22 See id.
28 [1971] IND. HousE J., 97th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., at 59.
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changes were made in the division of property section, but the mainten-
ance section and all references to maintenance in other sections were
deleted.
In the 1972 session, bills modeled after H.D. 1179 as amended
were introduced in each house of the General Assembly.2' Since these
bills repealed the very limited maintenance provisions in the old code
which had provided maintenance to former spouses divorced on grounds
of incurable insanity and confined to mental institutions and to spouses
seeking separation from bed and board,2" legislators realized that some
maintenance would be needed for the incapacitated spouse or she would
be left desolate.26 To meet this objection section 10(b) of the House
bill, which pertained to separation agreements, was amended by the
Senate to read:
The court may make no provision for maintenance; Provided,
However, That when the court finds a spouse to be physically or
mentally incapacitated, the court may make provision for the
maintenance of said spouse subject to further order of court.27
The real dispute arose over the division of property section. The
Senate was adamant that any bill it passed revising the divorce code
should include language makiig fault a criterion i3n making the divi-
sion. As a result a fourth criterion for the court to consider, "the con-
duct of the parties during the marriage," was addcd to each bill..8 In
effect the Senate was saying that they were willing to accept no-fault
divorce where the parties could really prove that the marriage was ir-
retrievably broken, but the party responsible for the breakdown could
expect to pay for his faults by receiving a smaller share of the property.
The House was equally adamant in its desire to keep this provi-
sion out.2" This provision would have allowed the same evidence of
fault to be brought in under the rubric of property settlement which
the framers of the bill had sought to keep out by adopting no-fault
grounds. A Conference Committee was established in an effort to arrive
24House Bill No. 1021 and Senate Bill No. 66. See [1972] IND. HOUSE J., 97th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., at 35; [1972] IND. SENATE J., 97th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg.
Sess., at 46.
25 [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43, § 8, at 107; [19031 Ind. Lan s, ch. 48, § 2, at 114;
[1935] Ind. Acts, ch. 87, § 1, at 248; formerly IND. CODE §§ 31-1-12-3, -22-2 (1971).
2Letter from State Senator ferton Stanley to Stephen Pe inell, Oct. 21, 1974 (on
file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL).
27 [1972] IND. SENATE J. 443.
28 [1972] IND. SENATE J. 81 (S.B. 66), 553 (H.B. 1021).
29No bill passed the House with any provision containing fault as a relevant factor
to consider in making the property division.
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at a compromise. It made two proposals,"0 neither of which included
fault as a criterion in making the property division. The House voted
in favor of each,"' but the Senate failed to pass either. 2
Senator Stanley felt that the bills were rejected in 1972 because
the Conference Committee Report made no provision for the conduct
of the parties to be considered in any way, nor was the earning ability
of either party to be considered. Many felt the bill failed to provide
adequate protection for a respondent." Senator Stanley attempted to
resolve these problems when he introduced S.B. 68 in the 1973 legisla-
ture. 5
Senate Bill No. 68 read basically the same as the Senate drafts of
the 1972 bills. The fault controversy was finally resolved as a com-
promise was reached on section 11(d), the criterion relating to fault
of the parties. 8 The Senate Judiciary Committee amended it to allow
the courts to consider the conduct of the parties during the marriage
"as related to the acquisition, use, or disposition of their property.""
As a result of this compromise fault was eliminated as a punitive mea-
sure and became relevant only as it relates to a division of property.
Hence the fact that a spouse committed adultery would be irrelevant.
The fact that he gave his mistress a $500 ring would be quite relevant
and that sum should be deducted from his share of the property. 8
With the center of controversy focused on the fault provision,
little attention was paid to the addition of a fifth criterion, "the earn-
ings or earning ability of the parties,"3 " which was part of S.B. 68 as
introduced by Senator Stanley. Yet it is this provision which may
prove to be the major source of difficulty.
The House Judiciary Committee also made a significant change in
the bill. It took the maintenance provision out of the section relating to
separation agreements" and placed it in the section on final hearings as
section 9(c)."' This is important because, if the maintenance provision
had been left in the section relating to separation agreements, one could
30 [1972] IND. HOUSE 3. 707, 769.
31 Id. at 757, 775.
32 [1972] INn. SENATE 3. 692.
33 See Stanley, supra note 26.
34 Id.
35 [1973] IND. SENATE 3. 43.
86 Id. at 202 (S.B. 68, § 1, at 7, line 10).
3 Id.
38 Hopson, Summary of the New Indiana Dissolution of Marriage Law, in INDIANA
STATE BAR AssocIATioN, FAMILY LAW PRACTICE MANUAL at 11-6-, -13 (1974).
39 S.B. 68, [1973] Ind. Gen. Assembly, 98th Sess.
40 See id.
41 [1973] IND. HouSE J., 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., at 790.
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have argued that a court could make no provision for maintenance
absent a separation agreement. With this provision now in the section
on final hearings, it is clear that a court may order maintenance when-
ever the court finds the requirements of section 9(c) warrant it. The
language of section 9(c) was also changed so as to define incapacitation
in terms of conditions materially affecting one's ability to support one-
self."' As amended, the bill passed the House, the Senate concurred
in the amendments, and it was signed into law as Public Law 297"3 by
Governor Bowen.
To summarize: From the time that the first bill, patterned on the
Uniform Act, was introduced, the legislature made sigalficant changes
in both the maintenance and division of property provisions. In 1971
the maintenance provision of the proposed act and all references to
maintenance were deleted. In 1972 a maintenance provision was rein-
serted allowing maintenance awards when the very nebulous standard
of "incapacitation" was met. And in 1973 the concept of incapacita-
tion was defined more precisely, in terms of conditions "materially
affecting" a spouse's ability to support himself.
The first significant change with respect to property division was
that the distinction between marital and nonmarital property, borrowed
from the Uniform Act, was abandoned. The next change was that fault
was made a relevant criterion for the courts to consider in making the
division. Finally, the spouses' "earnings or earning ability" was also
made a relevant criterion for the courts to consider.
METHODS OF PAYMENT UNDER THE NEW ACT
The new Act provides two methods for payments between the
divorcing parties: maintenance, under section 9(c)," and division of
property under section 11." The multiple provisions of these two sec-
tions give rise to the need for courts to both interpret the individual
sections and coordinate their relationship as part of a coherent divorce
policy.
Section 9(c)
Section 9(c) provides for maintenance payments "when the court
finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent
that the ability of such incapacitated spouse to support himself or her-
421d.
43Id. at 1372.
4 4 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
4r IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
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self is materially affected . .. ."I As originally drafted section 9(c)
merely provided for maintenance payments to spouses who were "physi-
cally or mentally incapacitated." ' In 1973, the language was added
defining "incapacitation" in terms of conditions materially affecting a
spouse's ability to support himself or herself. Senator Stanley, one
of the sponsors, indicated that the purpose of the inserted language was
to meet the objection of many, that a wife who had devoted many
years to a marriage, and who had no special skills, could be divorced
without cause and left with no means of support. The present pro-
vision is a compromise in an effort to provide some means of sup-
port for a physically or mentally incapacitated spouse.48
Perhaps fearing that courts would interpret "incapacitation" nar-
rowly, so as to allow maintenance awards only to spouses who were
totally incapacitated, the committee may have changed the definition of
incapacitation in hopes of broadening the range of spouses eligible for
support. Senator Stanley has indicated that this was the legislature's
intention. 9 This interpretation of the Committee's purpose is further
reinforced by the marked tendency of the Indiana courts to read alimony
statutes narrowly." Undoubtedly aware that the courts would most
likely give this section a restricted interpretation, the Committee, in
adding the language, ensured that even a restricted reading of the new
provision would constitute an extension beyond the previous law.
The courts will be presented with many difficult cases calling for
interpretation of this section. The legislature has seemingly restricted
the courts' ability to continue refusing to award support payments.
When incapacitation materially affects a spouse's ability to support him-
self or herself, support payments are appropriate." The question which
the courts must now confront is what conditions constitute incapacita-
tion "materially" affecting a spouse's capacity for self-support. Is the
wife with five small children entitled to support? Unless given support
she will be forced to find employment and hire another to take care of
the children. Should the elderly or middle-aged housewife who has lost
any marketable skills she might once have had be entitled to support?
Is the burden of child-rearing a loss of marketable skills which should
46 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
4T See text at note 27 supra.
4 Stanley, supra note 26.
49Id.
50 See, e.g., State ex rel. Schutz v. Marion Super. Ct., - Ind. -, 307 N.E.2d 53
(1974) ; Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956).
51IN. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
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be considered an incapacitation which has materially affected one's
ability to support himself or herself ?"2
The elderly housewife presents the stronger case for allowing a
support award. Her loss of the opportunity to acquire marketable skills,
or her loss of those she may once have had, has, without doubt, materi-
ally affected her ability to support herself. While the legislature may
have wished to avoid allowing support to the "alimony drone,""3 sec-
tion 9 (c), as Senator Stanley suggests," should not be so narrowly con-
strued as to force a long-married, middle-aged or older woman, "in-
capacitated" because of lack of any marketable skills, to fend for her-
self.5"
Women in these circumstances differ from mothers with children.
Whereas the former have lost or failed to acquire marketable skills
because of their age and duration of marriage, the latter will still be
young enough to have retained any marketable skills acquired before
the marriage, or they could return to school or receive training to ac-
quire the same level of skill they would have obtained had they not been
married. The earning ability of these younger women has only been
affected by the fact that they have children and have chosen to stay
at home to rear the children rather than go outside the home to find
employment."0
The Uniform Act, in section 308, adopted the policy of support to a
mother who lacks sufficient resources to care for her dependent chil-
dren. 7 Operating under a statute based on the Uniform Act, an Iowa
court granted a 40-year-old mother support alimo ay even though she
could find adequate employment as a nurse. 8 The Indiana legislature
having rejected section 210 of the proposed act," vhich was based on
the Uniform Act, it would appear that the legislature intended to reject
the policy of granting maintenance awards to mothers with children.
52 See Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (Fla. App. 1973).
53 Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc. 4, 6, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (1957). The term "alimony
drone," of course, refers to the ex-spouse who, although capable of supporting himself
or herself, prefers to live off the earnings of the other ex-spouse.
54 Stanley, supra note 26.
55 Cf. Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (Fla. App. 1973).
56 For example, suppose the wife is qualified to work as a secretary for $2.50 an
hour. If not awarded support she would be forced to go to work, which would require
her to hire a sitter or place the children in a day care center should they be young enough
to require such care. If the sitter is paid $1.75 an hour, the wcrking mother is clearing
only $30.00 per week (working a 40-hour week) over what she is paying the sitter.
Taxes and social security will be deducted from this, so it is po3sible she may in fact be
losing money by working. Indeed, she may even be required to seek welfare.
57 See Uniform Act § 308(a) (2) (1970).
N In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974).
59 See note 21 supra.
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However, the later insertion of the broad language defining "incapacita-
tion" in section 9(c) can be viewed as reinstating this policy. Given
the policy behind the Indiana statute to allow maintenance to former
spouses whose ability to support themselves is materially affected due to
some mental or physical "incapacitation," it would seem consistent with
this policy to allow mothers with children to remain at home rather
than find employment when it would be psychologicaly detrimental
or economically impractical for them to work."
Should the court grant an award under section 9(c), the question
yet remains what factors should be 'considered in deciding how much
should be granted. Since under the'old act Indiana did not allow for
support alimony, there would be no local precedent available. Thus,
Indiana must look elsewhere for criteria to use in making the award."
The two most important factors have traditionally been the one spouse's
ability to pay and the other's need. 3 In addition to these, other factors
which the courts have traditionally considered are the ages and health
of the parties, the duration of the marriage, what the wife gave up
when she married, the couple's standard of living during the marriage,
the total property of the parties, and the extent to which the wife, by
her own efforts, contributed to the accumulation of that property."
Because section 9(c) focuses exclusively on a spouse's ability to support
himself or herself-i.e., the spouse's need-other factors not related to
need are irrelevant. Thus, the courts should restrict their consideration
to the one spouse's need, and, by implication, the other spouse's ability
to meet that need with support payments. 5
60 "Just as children need a roof over their heads, they need a mother-custodian who
is fed and clothed. In short, for conceptual as well as psychological reasons, child sup-
port awards should include a sum for the mother's maintenance." R. LEvY. UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYsIs 145 (1968.1
-Indeed, arguments will be made that the grant follows from the term "incapacita-
tion." WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1958) defines "incapable"
which is the root for "incapacitation" as "not capable; wanting in capacity, ability or quali-
fication for the purpose or end in view . . . ." Synonyms are "unqualified, disqualified,
inefficient." Requiring mothers to seek employment outside the home will render many
mothers less efficient.
62 It would be relevant, however, to consider the criteria the Indiana courts have
used in making decrees for temporary support. The rule has been that in determining
the amount of temporary support the court should consider both the husband's ability to
pay and the needs of the wife. Rooney v. Rooney, 231 Ind. 443, 109 N.E.2d 93 (1952) ;
Snider v. Snider, 179 Ind. 583, 102 N.E. 32 (1913) ; Yost v. Yost, 141 Ind. 584, 41 N.E.
11 (1895).
63 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 441-45.
64Id. at 445-47. See also Uniform Act § 308(a) (1970).
65In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974), is illustrative of the type
of case where this award may be made. In that case the wife had started a career teach-
ing nursing. She gave that up for the sixteen and one-half years she was married to
become a homemaker and mother. "But no one, upon proper reflection, could say her
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Another important aspect of section 9(c) is the question of how
long payments should continue. That section provides that payments
are to be made "during any such incapacity, subject to further order of
the court.""6 This would take care of the spouse who, for example, re-
quired support while hospitalized, but upon release from the hospital
could return to work. When there is no longer an incapacity the court
should order that the payments cease. This language would also au-
thorize rehabilitative alimony, thereby providing sufficient support to
enable the spouse to attain skills lost or forgone due to the marriage.
The language of section 9(c) is certainly broader than the language
in the old code. The language defining incapacitation in terms of im-
pairment of the ability to support oneself appears to have been an
effort to make it even broader so as to allow maintenance for the wife
who has lost her skills after many years of marriage.6 7 Even though
the legislature rejected any form of maintenance in 1971,"8 it is clear
that by 1973 at least part of the policies embodied in section 308 of the
Uniform Act (section 210 of the proposed act) were restored. The
language of section 9(c) is sufficiently broad to enable the court to
interpret the section so as to completely restore these policies and allow
maintenance for the spouse who has custody of children requiring his
or her care. Such an interpretation would be good policy, yet still be
short of a general maintenance award.
Section II
Section 11 provides five criteria to guide the court in making a
division of property between the spouses. In light of certain judicial
developments in the area of property division under Indiana's old divorce
law,"0 it is now possible to construe section 11 so as to permit awards
under the guise of property division which, in terms of their effect, are
nearly indistinguishable from maintenance awards under section 9(c).
Moreover, although section 11 was based on the Uniform Act's divi-
sion of property provision, the legislature's departure from that provi-
sion has created the possibility of much broader awards than the Uni-
career has not been affected by her virtual removal from her prcfession and its technical
and scientific changes during sixteen and one-half years." Accordingly, the court awarded
her alimony "during the year and a half she might require to obtain her master's degree
or otherwise rehabilitate her career." Id. at 174.
66 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).637See notes 50-57 supra & text accompanying.
08 See text at note 23 supra.
6 9 IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
70 Hibbard v. Hibbard, - Ind. App. - , 315 N.E.2d 731 (1974) ; Weiss v. Weiss,
- Ind. App. -, 306 N.E.2d 120 (1974).
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form Act would permit.
Given the Indiana courts' tradition of reluctance to allow mainten-
ance awards, creative lawyering may yield for a deserving spouse an
award under section 11 functionally equivalent to one that was arbitrarily
denied under section 9(c). Although this result is preferable to leaving
the spouse with no award whatsoever, collateral problems relating to,
modification and enforcement of the awards as well as taxation make it
necessary for the legislature to redraft the provisions in order to give
the courts clear guidance as to its policies.
Using Section 11 to Provide De Facto Maintenance
Under section 11 all the property of the parties, regardless of when
or how acquired, is to be divided by the court in "a just and reasonable
manner.' ;71 Although five factors to be considered are listed in section
11,72 the fifth criterion, "(e) the earnings or earning ability of the
parties as related to a final division of property and final determination
of the property rights of the parties,"7 may prove to have the greatest
significance. Earnings and earning ability are not new factors. Indeed,
they have been routinely cited in numerous Indiana cases as being proper
criteria to be used in making a division of property. 4
A significant change, however, has occurred recently in defining
earning ability. Proceeding under the old divorce law, the court in
Weiss v. Weiss,"5 instead of merely regarding a spouse's earning ability
as a factor to be considered in dividing the property between the parties,
capitalized earning ability as an asset to be divided between them. The
parties' total combined property, excluding earning ability, was valued at
$13,000 in personalty and $10,000 in realty. The husband had a salary
of $23,000 a year, and variable partnership income which had amounted
to $14,000 at one time in the past. The wife worked as a nurse, earning
$8,100 per year. The court granted the husband $10,000 of the per-
sonal property and granted the wife the remaining $3,000 in personal
property, plus $20,000 in alimony. (The realty, held by the entireties,
n1Nn. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
72 The court should first look under criterion (a) to the contribution of each spouse
to the acquisition of the property, including the contribution of the wife as homemaker.
The other side of the coin is criterion (b), "the extent to which the property was ac-
quired by each spouse prior to the marriage or through inheritance or gift." The third
criterion is the economic circumstances of the spouse, and the fourth criterion is fault
as related to dissipation of assets.
73IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11(e) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
7-See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 146 Ind. App. 455, 256 N.E.2d 589 (1970) ; Languell v.
Languell, 143 Ind. App. 24, 237 N.E.2d 587 (1968) ; Cornwell v. Cornwell, 108 Ind. App.
350, 29 N.E.2d 317 (1940) ; Glick v. Glick, 86 Ind. App. 593, 159 N.E. 33 (1927).
75- Ind. App. - , 306 N.E.2d 120 (1974).
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was not disposed of in the decree.) It is clear that the parties did not
have sufficient property at the time of divorce to justify an award of
$20,000 for alimony without considering the husband's future earnings
as a distributable assetY.
A similiar result was reached in Hibbard v. Hibbard,77 where the
husband claimed that the property at the time of divorce was of negative
value. He was awarded $24,550 worth of property, which included the
house which had a $12,000 mortgage. On a weekly salary of $275, he
was ordered to pay the mortgage plus $10,747 in other debts. After
paying the debts, he would have been left with property worth $1,803.
The wife was awarded $21,650 in "property" which included an
alimony award of $18,300. Again, the parties did not have sufficient
property to justify an alimony award of $18,300 unless the court used
the husband's earning ability as an asset to be divided. Yet the appel-
late court, citing Weiss, found no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in making this award."8
Although both Weiss and Hibbard were decided under the old law,
they may indicate how the courts will construe section 11(e). By in-
cluding capitalized future earnings as an asset, and by considering the
parties' economic circumstances, the courts can make property divisions
which approximate the results of support awards. The spouse facing
circumstances that should qualify as incapacitation under section 9(c)
would receive about the same kind of support urder section 11."' In
76 An interesting-and perhaps limiting-rationale was mentioned by the court. Aft-
er their marriage, the wife went to work and the husband returned to college-one and
one-half years in undergraduate school, and seven years in graduate school culminating
in a Ph. D. The appellate court noted: "Probably in recognition of Darlene's financial
contributions to the family which apparently was a factor in Doyle's advanced and ex-
tensive education and ability to earn a good income, the trial court awarded Darlene
$20,000." - Ind. App. at - , 306 N.E.2d at 124. Likenirg the wife's actions here
to situations where "by her industry and economy [she] has contributed to the accumula-
tion of the husband's property," the trial court's approach was found to be supported by
"logic and reason." Id. at -, 306 N.E.2d at 125.
77_- Ind. App. - , 315 N.E.2d 731 (1974).
78 Id. at - , 315 N.E.2d at 735. In Hibbard there was also evidence that the wife
had helped build up the family's Hibbard Construction Co., and "spent many weeks in
the employ of the company without compensation." Id. at - , 315 N.E.2d at 734. In
upholding the award of alimony, the appellate court noted th'- evidence of the "wife's
contribution to the accumulation of the husband's property by her industry" and the
husband's present ability to earn. Both Hibbard and Weiss m iy be narrowly construed
to create in the wife a present right to a share of her ex-husband's future earnings
where his present earning power derives from her past contribitions.
79 Suppose a wife is institutionalized with a permanent disability so that she has no
earning ability to contribute. The husband has a capitalized erning ability of $300,000.
The cost of her support is $75,000. Under section 9(c) the court may make a provision
for her support while she is incapacitated which would cover the costs of her institution-
alization. The husband would pay $75,000 for maintenance and retain $225,000. Under
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addition, a material incapacitation short of being total would also be
compensated under section 11 as it would be under section 9(c).8 The
greater one spouse's loss in earning ability, the more the other will be
required to contribute from his future earnings to make up for the
difference in earning abilities. Given the legislative history of these
sections,"' it would appear that the legislature did not intend to provide
for this kind of maintenance award. Yet by allowing the courts to
consider earning ability as an asset, and to take into account all the
economic circumstances in dividing the property, the legislature has in
fact authorized just such awards.
After deciding how much capitalized earning ability there is to
divide,82 the court must still determine how this amount should be di-
section 11 she would be entitled to whatever part of the assets she had helped to acquire.
In addition the courts should consider her economic circumstances and award her what-
ever further funds would be required to meet the costs of her hospitalization. If the
wife's contribution to the total assets was worth $50,000, she would receive an additional
$25,000 in consideration of her economic circumstances. This would represent the amount
needed for her to obtain a level of subsistence in light of her needs. The husband would
retain $225,000, or the same amount he would retain under section 9(c).
80 For example, consider the case of the elderly lady who has lost her marketable
skills and qualifies under section 9(c). Suppose the parties' only assets are their capi-
talized earning abilities. Before the marriage the wife was a nurse. She has lost those
skills, so her earning ability is only one-half of what it would have been as a nurse. The
husband's earning ability is valued at $200,000. The wife's earning ability would be valued
at $100,000 had she retained her skills but only $50,000 since she lost them. If these
assets were equally divided each would receive $150,000 had she retained her skills as a
nurse. The husband would pay her $50,000 from his future earnings. With these skills
lost there would only be $250,000 to divide so each would receive $125,000. Now the
husband would pay her $75,000 since the difference in earning ability is greater.
81 See text at notes 21-43 supra.
82 There is no particular method for capitalizing earning ability that has been adopted
by courts. Generally, the first step is to determine how long each spouse may expect to
live and earn income. Mortality tables may be used as evidence of a spouse's life ex-
pectancy, and other evidence would be admissible to show that a particular spouse's life
expectancy may be greater or shorter than indicated by the tables. The second step is to
determine how much each spouse would have earned during these years. See 3 Am. JuR.
PROOF OF FACTS 618-41 (1959). The third step is to determine the rate of capitalization.
In the business world the rate of capitalization is a reflection of the market's confidence in
the stability of the business. D. HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 151 (1966). In this
situation the court must choose a ratio which reflects the risk that a spouse will not earn
the previously determined earning ability. Without the aid of the market the court may
only speculate as to what it might be.
Once earning ability is capitalized as an asset, two other problems are presented.
First, how much, if any, of this amount is to be deducted for personal consumption? In
order to avoid a serious tax inequity, a division of property for family law purposes
should be defined as being that property remaining after payment of all income taxes
and debts. Otherwise the spouse with the greater earning ability would be required to
pay the tax on the amount he makes before he gives a percentage of the remainder to his
spouse in order to reduce the disparity in earning ability.
The second problem would be for the court to reduce any lump sum awards to their
present values. It is evident that if a spouse receives the award today he will have the
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vided. The statute seems to contemplate that the marriage is a partner-
ship, the assets of which are to be divided by a standard of fairness and
reasonableness. This certainly will allow the trial court to continue
exercising a great deal of discretion. Certain guidelines, however, can
be suggested.
As a starting proposition the court should begin with the idea
that, all things being equal, each partner is entitled to one-half the total
assets. After the court capitalizes the earning abilities of both the hus-
band and the wife and deducts taxes and debts, these amounts are
totaled and divided by two." The problem with this approach is that
the statute requires the court to consider the contribution of each spouse
to the acquisition of the property including the contribution of a spouse
as homemaker. In some cases this requirement would have the effect
of totally negating the effect of capitalizing earning ability. If the hus-
band has a capitalized earning ability of $300,000 and the wife $150,000,
it can be argued that his share of their aggregate capitalized earnings
should be twice as much as hers. This theory depends on the husband's
being able to prove that the asset, his earning ability, was acquired
solely by his own efforts.84 If he can prove that, his income should be
treated in the same manner as though he had received it as a gift.
The analysis, however, should not end here. There are many ways
in which one spouse may contribute to the earning ability of the other.
A wife may directly contribute to the husband's earning ability. She
may, for example, have worked to put him through graduate school.85
Had she not worked to put him through school his earning ability would
probably be significantly decreased. The wife should be allowed to
share in these increased earnings as she has invested time, effort, and
money to the acquisition of this increased earning ability of the hus-
band." Theoretically, in the division of this asset, she should receive
whatever represents her contribution to his earning ability.
The wife may also indirectly contribute to the earning ability of
opportunity to invest that sum, opportunities which the paying sfouse who must wait to
earn the money would not have. Standard annuity tables, of coucse, will be helpful.
83 If the total assets were $450,000 with the husband having contributed $300,000
and the wife $150,000, then each would be entitled to $225,000. The husband would be
required to make up the difference in earning ability, so he would pay the wife $75,000
from his future earnings.
8 Cf. notes 76 & 78 supra.
8 See Weiss v. Weiss, - Ind. App. -, 306 N.E.2d 120 (1974).
go See Note, Alimony Awards Under No Fault Divorce Statutes, 53 NEB. L. Ruv.
126, 129 (1974).
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the husband. The statute expressly contemplates that the contribution
of a spouse as homemaker should also be taken into account. This will
require the court to consider not only those services subject to direct
monetary expression, such as housekeeping; but also to consider those
intangible contributions incapable of precise measurement, such as
providing the meals, taking care of and raising the family, being a
companion and lover. The longer the spouse has provided these benefits
and the better she was at providing them the more she has helped in
the acquisition of the asset and the more she should receive when it
is divided. Whether the asset is a house or earning ability the principle
should be the same. The problem in each of these cases will be to deter-
mine how much a wife has contributed to the acquisition of the hus-
band's earning ability. It should also be noted that a working wife may
provide the same intangible benefits as the housewife and therefore may
also be considered as contributing to the acquisition of the husband's
earning ability.
Awards Under Section 11 and Under the Uniform Act
Results obtained under the Indiana division of property statute
can be even broader than those obtained under the Uniform Act's divi-
sion of property and maintenance provisions. Under the Uniform Act,
the property is first divided with each party receiving that which he or
she acquired independently-i.e., the nonmarital property." Then the
property they acquired together-marital property-is divided between
them. In dividing marital property the court may consider the contri-
bution of each spouse to its ac.quisition as well as the spouses' economic
circumstances.8 Although no explanation of "economic circumstances"
is given in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation: A Pre-
liminary Analysis,9 the term seems to refer to any economic disparity
resulting from setting aside to each spouse his or her respective non-
marital property. After the division of both nonmarital and marital
property, maintenance may be awarded only if the available property
87 The nonmarital property is that property acquired by each spouse separately as by
gift, inheritance, or prior to marriage. Uniform Act § 307.
88 Note that under the Uniform Act, section 307, economic circumstances are con-
sidered in reducing the disparity which results from the division of marital and nonmari-
tal property, but only in dividing the marital property. Hence, if the husband owns and
receives all the nonmarital property and there is only $100 of marital property, in con-
sidering economic circumstances the court may give the entire $100 to the wife, but it
may not give her any of the nonmarital property as part of a division of property.
89 R. LEvy, UNiFORm MAm.AGE AND DivoRCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALY-
sis (1968). Levy was the primary author of the Uniform Act and wrote this work as ex-
planation and commentary to it.
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is insufficient for the purpose of meeting needs and if the spouse who
seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his
skills and interests or is occupied with childcare."' Since the "standard
of living established during the marriage" is a factor to be considered
in making the maintenance award," it would be appropriate to use the
same standard as that used in determining "economic circumstances"
under the provision for property division. If a spouse is not given
enough property to maintain the standard of living- established during
the marriage, he may be awarded under the maintenance provision an
amount sufficient to allow him to meet his "reasonable needs" to main-
tain this standard of living.
Even assuming that the Indiana courts construe section 9(c) re-
strictively, this same result can be obtained under section 11 of the
Indiana Act if the spouse would qualify for maintenance under the
Uniform Act. Instead of explicitly separating marital and nonmarital
property as the Uniform Act does, the Indiana statute lumps it all to-
gether. However, in the course of dividing the property, the court con-
siders what the contribution of each spouse was to the acquisition of
the property' 2 and whether it was acquired by gift, inheritance, or ac-
quired before the marriage;"' in effect, then, the court does separate
the two types of property.
Under the Uniform Act separation of marital and nonmarital prop-
erty will leave a disparity which may be narrowed by considering the
economic circumstances of the parties;" if a spouse is still in need of
further property to provide for his reasonable needs and is unable to
support himself he may receive a maintenance award from the future
earnings of the other spouse. 5 Under the Indiana statute, however, the
future earnings are an asset to be divided along with the marital and
nonmarital property. The future earnings of each spouse are capitalized,
and in separating the spouses' shares, the court should consider the con-
90 The spouse may yet receive a maintenance award if the two requirements of sec-
tion 308 are met:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him,
to provide for his reasonable needs, and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose conditions or circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
91 Uniform Act § 308(b) (3).92 Ip. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11(a) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
3 IT-. AN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
9, See note 88 supra.
95 Uniform Act § 308. See note 90 supra.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the other's earning ability.
Having separated the marital and nonmarital property as well as the
future earnings of each spouse, the court, prior to final division of the
assets, should consider the spouses' relative "economic circumstances"
in order to reduce the disparity in their positions. This disparity may
be the result of the separation of marital and nonmarital property, and
it may also reflect the difference in the spouses' future earning abilities.
In making the final division, the court should take this disparity into
account and divide the property so as to ensure that each spouse receives
enough "property" to meet the reasonable needs of a person having
the standard of living enjoyed by the spouse during the marriage. Hence
under both section 11 of the Indiana Act and the property division and
maintenance provisions of the Uniform Act, each spouse may receive
enough property to satisfy his reasonable needs."
06 The division of property, including capitalized earning ability, which results under
the present provision of the Indiana Code can approximate those reached under the Uni-
form Act, although the manner of computation is different. Assume the following situa-
tion:
Husband (H) brought $100,000 of property into the marriage, which his wife (W)
did not assist him in acquiring. H also received, during the marriage, an inheritance of
$100,000. At divorce, H's capitalized earning ability is $300,000; W supported H through
college, so that $100,000 of this is ascribable to her assistance. W's present capitalized
earning ability is $50,000, of which H's assistance can be valued at $10,000. There is
$80,000 in property acquired during marriage, to which both H and W contributed equally.
In tabular form, the assets would be:
Assets
H's property before marriage: $100,000
H's inheritance: 100,000
Property acquired during marriage: 80,000
H's capitalized earning ability: 300,000
W's capitalized earning ability: 50,000
Available assets: $630,000
Division under the Uniform Act:
Although the Uniform Act first sets aside to each spouse his separate property ac-
quired before or independently of marriage, section 308 awards to the 'wife, as mainte-
nance, an amount sufficient to meet her needs, as established by the standard of living en-
joyed during marriage, to the extent her separate property and her own earning ability
do not suffice. Thus, the court first establishes the bottom line-the wife's reasonable
needs-and then computes the division of the spouses' assets to arrive at the figure se-
lected. So, if the present value of the income reasonably necessary to maintain the
wife at her current standard of living is $250,000, then the court would first seek to
satisfy this out of her own future earnings ($50,000) and her separate property ($0).
Next, propurty acquired during marriage would be divided so as to reflect the balance
yet due (assume $60,000 of the $80,000). This leaves $140,000 to which W is entitled,
an amount the court will order paid periodically or in a lump sum as maintenance (Uni-
form Act § 308(b)). (Note that W's limited earning ability-$50,000 total-is the cru-
cial factor that qualifies her for the full $140,000 in maintenance; were there no dis-
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ability, W's earning ability would be sufficient to release H of any maintenance responsi-
bility. Uniform Act § 308(c) (2).)
Uniform Act
Assets H W
H's property before marriage: $100,000
H's inheritance: 100,000
Property acquired during marriage: 20,000 $ 60,000
H's earnings 160,000 140,000 (maintena.uce)
WVs earnings 50,000
$380,000 $250,000
Division Under the Indiana Code:
Section 31-1-11.5-11 directs that the division of property be "just and reasonable."
In terms of the bottom line for W, this might take one of three forms: (1) an amount
sufficient to keep the wife from being a public charge; (2) an -mount sufficient to main-
tain the standard of living established during marriage (equivalent to the Uniform Act's
approach), or (3) an equal division of property. Assuming that $80,000 is the present
value of the amount necessary to keep W off welfare, $250,000 is sufficient to maintain
her at her present standard of living, and $315,000 is half of all assets, then the amount
H must pay from his capitalized earnings is determined by thu difference between W's
own assets (including her separate claims to H's income because of her contributions),
and the bottom figure. Remembering that W may claim $100,000 of H's earnings by vir-
tue of her having assisted H in reaching his present earning ability, and that H may
claim $10,000 of W's present earning ability for similar reasons, and that each contributed
half of the property acquired during marriage, then the computations would be as fol-
lows:
Welfare Level
Assets H W
H's property before marriage: $100,000
H's inheritance: 100,000
Property acquired during marriage: 40,000 $ 40,000
H's capitalized earning ability: 200,000 100,000
W's capitalized earning ability: 10,000 40,000
$450,000 $180,000
Since WV is above the welfare level, no further transfer from B's earning ability is war-
ranted.
Maintaining Standard of Living
Assets H W
H's property before marriage: $100,000
H's inheritance: 100,000
Property acquired during marriage: 40,000 $ 40,000
H's capitalized earning ability: 130,000 170,000
W's capitalized earning ability: 10,000 40,000
$380,000 $250,000
Here, $70,000 of H's earning ability was transferred to W. However, the $70,000 could
also be considered to have been taken from H's separate property, a distinction which
would have different tax consequences for H and U'.
Parity
Assets H W
H's property before marriage: $ 50,000 $ 50,000
H's inheritance: 50,000- 50,000
Property acquired during marriage: 40,000 40,000
H's capitalized earning ability: 150,000 150,000
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Indeed, the Indiana statute may go beyond the Uniform Act and
fail to give the paying spouse as much protection as is secured by the
Uniform Act. The sole concern of the Uniform Act is to ensure that
each party receives enough assets to satisfy his reasonable needs. If,
after a division of property pursuant to section 307, this goal is at-
tained, no maintenance awards are permitted no matter how great the
disparity between the, spouses' relative economic positions. Under sec-
tion 11 of the Indiana Act, which does not contain the same limitations
as the maintenance provision of the Uniform Act, the relatively poorer
spouse could still receive part of the other spouse's future income as a
division of assets, notwithstanding need. This would mean, then, that
each spouse would receive half of the couple's total assets, including
earning ability. Such a result is obtainable by interpreting the section
11(c) command to consider each spouse's "economic circumstances" as
one demanding absolute parity of the spouses' positions after dissolu-
tion. Courts seeking to avoid this result have several alternatives. The
first is to read "economic circumstances" as authorizing courts to reduce
the disparity between the spouses' positions only to the extent that the
relatively poorer spouse has enough property to satisfy his reasonable
needs."7 This would effectuate the policies behind the Uniform Act but
in the form of a limitation on property division rather than on main-
tenance awards. ,
A second alternative would be for courts to refuse to capitalize
future earnings under section 11(e) and instead construe the main-
tenance provisions of section 9(c) to have the same limitation as the
maintenance provision of the Uniform Act. This would foreclose the
possibility of receiving de facto maintenance awards in the guise of
property division awards, while it would enable the needy spouse to
receive under the Indiana Act the same maintenance award as would be
available under the Uniform Act.
W's capitalized earning ability: 25,000 25,000
$315,000 $315,000
Here, again, W's bottom line figure of $315,000 could also be satisfied by a $135,000 trans-
fer of H's earning ability, rather than from an equal splitting of all assets. Since the
Code does not direct from which source-property or earnings-the transfer shall be
made, the tax treatment of such payments remains unclear.
97 "Reasonable needs" can be defined to mean that amount of property which will
keep the spouse from being a public charge, or that amount which will maintain the
spouse at the standard of living established during marriage-approaches which empha-
size the notion of "needs." Alternatively, the amount awarded may simply represent a
straight one-half of all property available to the spouses upon their divorce, an approach
that equates "reasonableness" with parity. See note 96 supra.
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Finally, the courts could refuse to capitalize future earnings and
also refuse to construe section 9(c) as allowing maintenance awards
except in extremely limited circumstances. This would, in effect, return
the Indiana divorce law relating to property division and maintenance
to approximately the same position as before the enactment of the pres-
ent statute. It would seem that a full return is foreclosed since under
the old law maintenance awards were rendered only in cases of in-
sanity;08 no matter how restrictively the courts read the present stand-
ard governing maintenance-incapacitation materially affecting ability
to support oneself-it seems impossible that only insanity would con-
stitute such incapacitation.
The possibility of capitalizing future earnings was probably unfore-
seen by the legislature. As previously noted, important consequences
relating to the tax treatment of an award, as well as its enforcement
and modification, may result from labeling it as a division of property
or as maintenance. 0 Litigation will likely arise in the tax area as the
party who is required to pay his former spouse from his future earnings
will claim a deduction for alimony when he makes these payments. At
the same time, the recipient spouse will seek to exclude such payments
from taxable income on the grounds that they represent a division of
property-not alimony support. The tax court will look behind the
label the state attaches to see whether the award is for support or a
division of property."'
The fact that a property division is not subject to modification may
prove to be the most significant consequence of this distinction. Many
problems and much unfairness will be created by basing the division of
property on earning ability and then not permitting modification when
there has been a subsequent change in that ability.0 1
os [1873] Ind. Laws, ch. 43, § 8, at 107; [1935] Ind. Acts, ,h. 87, § 1, at 243. Al-
though the old code also made provision for maintenance for spoases separated from bed
and board, [1903] Ind. Laws, ch. 48, § 2, at 114, this should be irrelevant under the new
code because the separation from bed and board section was repc ded, leaving only provi-
sions for absolute divorce.
0 See note 9 supra.
100 See, e.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963).
101 Bourman v. Bourman, 155 Kan. 602, 127 P.2d 464 (1930) It has been suggested
that insurance may be required to meet the harshness of this r(sult. Special forms of
alimony insurance may be specially devised to cope with this problem so as to assure that
funds will be available should the spouse become disabled or lose his job. Alimony in-
surance may also be a possible solution should the court grant a :.pouse a lump sum pay-
ment award rather than making it payable in installments. Se6 Basic Family Support
Needs Can Be Met by Divorce Insurance, 1 BNA FAMILY L. RrrR. 2085 (Dec. 3, 1974).
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THE NEED FOR REFORM
Regardless of how broadly or narrowly sections 9 and 11 are in-
terpreted, trial courts will possess considerable discretion in making
property division and maintenance awards. Should they capitalize
earning ability, as authorized by section 11 (e), the result will be a con-
fused mixture of which Professor Clark warns:
Many courts, however, assimilat- the property division to the
alimony decree, taking into account in dividing the property the
same sort of factors which are relevant in setting alimony. These
include the extent of husband's property, the wife's needs, [and]
the duration of the marriage . . . . The authority to make the
division is usually granted in general terms, limited only by the re-
quirement that the result be "just" or "reasonable". It is easy
to see how, relying on a vague statutory power, the courts have
come to blur the distinction between alimony orders and division
of property 1 0 2
To prevent such confusion the legislature should redraft the main-
tenance and division of property sections so as to make clear what
policies each is designed to serve and what factors should be con-
sidered in making each award. It is evident from the history of the pres-
ent act that the legislature would not enact a statute containing a sup-
port provision that guarantees awards for ex-spouses even if they can
support themselves. While the state should not encourage the "alimony
drone,"'0 3 a statute could be drafted to allow support for those spouses
who have a definite need. Section 9(c) was aimed at this result, but the
language defining incapacitation, as has been seen, is very ambiguous.
Should a limited maintenance statute be drafted, it can accomplish
several policies.
The first and most important of all the functions of alimony
relates to the care of children. . . . If [the mother] is to be
able to care for them adequately, she herself must be supported,
alimony being in most cases the only source available .... 104
1
02 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 450-51. The distinction between these two purposes
for making the award is important. Strictly speaking, a division of property between the
parties is not alimony, although it may incidentally provide a source of income from
which a spouse may derive support. See Note, Alimony in Indiana: Traditional Con-
cepts v. Benefit to Society, 29 IND. L.J. 461, 464 (1954). The award serves as a final de-
termination of the property rights of the parties and is based on the presumption that
henceforth they will be mutually independent. See Note, Indiana's Alimony Confusion, 45
IND. L.J. 595 (1970). The support concept of alimony has diffe mt historical origins and
was awarded only to a separated wife in order to satisfy her co tinuing need for support
upon separation of the spouses.
103 See note 53 supra.
104 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 441-42.
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Alimony may also be necessary to minimize the financial impact of the
divorce and to prevent the wife's becoming dependent upon public
support." 5 Further, alimony may serve as compensation for the spouse's
faithful services. 06
Adopting the maintenance provision of the Uniform Act (section
210 of Indiana's Proposed Act) would effectuate these policies while
withholding general maintenance from spouses who really have no need.
The Uniform Act's maintenance provision abolishe., alimony in all cases
except where a spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his
reasonable needs and is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or where a spouse is the custodian of a child whose condi-
tion or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be re-
quired to seek employment outside the home.1"7
An order for a division of property should have a different func-
tion than a maintenance award. In noncommunity property states, the
purpose is to unscramble the ownership of the property, giving to each
spouse what is equitably his."0 8 The Indiana division of property statute
could be made to conform to this function simply by removing section
11(e), which permits judicial consideration of earnings and earning
ability, thereby leaving only current assets of the parties to be divided,
and leaving whatever allocation of future income that may be necessary
to be considered as part of a maintenance award.
CONCLUSION
Sections 9 (c) and 11 of the present Indiana divorce code are unique
provisions for maintenance and division of property. It will be the
duty of the courts to define their scope and meaning. It is clear that
some changes have been made in the law with the adoption of the new
code, but should the courts construe these sections narrowly the changes
would be negligible. Given the courts' treatment of the old alimony law
in refusing to recognize support awards, and the legislative history of
the new law which indicates an intent to broaden the alimony law while
stopping short of authorizing general support awards, it is likely that
such a narrow construction will prevail. The confused situation of
105 Id.
106 Id.; REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY TO THE CITIZENS'
ADvIsoRY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 8-9 (1968). As the Task Force on Fam-
ily Law and Policy noted, "[Allimony should recognize a contribution made by a spouse
to the family's well-being which would otherwise be without recompense."
107 Uniform Act § 308. See note 90 supra.
108 H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 449-50.
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alimony law should. not be left to the judiciary to remedy. Rather, the
Indiana legislature should draft a statute recognizing the policy dis-
tinctions between maintenance and division of property, and providing
dear guidelines to aid courts in making this distinction.
STEPHEN R. PENNELL
